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garment sector, we develop a geographical political economy dynamic
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1 Introduction
‘Globalization’ - specifically the globalizing of production and trade - brought
with it new analysis and a new language. The Global Value Chains (GVC)
framework played an essential role in understanding the governance of a now
globalized production. GVC analysis emerged out of the Global Commodity
Chain (GCC) framework of Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994), but went be-
yond the commodity by introducing governance categories that attempted to
map the asymmetrical relationships between the various actors in the chain.
Gereffi’s (2002) original conception divided supply chains into two distinct
categories of governance: producer-driven and buyer-driven, while Gereffi et
al. (2005) identified five types: market, modular, relational, captive and hi-
erarchical.
These frameworks have been an important means by which to analyze global
production, upgrading, trade and the developmental process. Despite these
successes, the GVC approach has been criticized for being static and not
accounting for geographical, social and institutional specificities. These cri-
tiques were addressed by the introduction of the Global Production Networks
(GPN) approach (Dicken et al. 2001; Henderson et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2004,
2008; Yeung 2009, Coe and Yeung 2015). In addition, GPNs aimed to cap-
ture how different actors including states and institutions influence global
production. They emphasize three variables: (i) value, (ii) power relations
that affect the distribution of value and (iii) territorial embeddedness that
takes account of the various social and institutional implications of global
production. While GPNs added much needed complexity by including both
co-constitutive and contingent factors, this approach has been criticized for
lacking the explanatory power of the GVC framework1.
This tension between complexity and explanatory power opens up a major
gap and can, in part, explain the absence of a framework that captures the
dynamics of GVC governance structures. The present paper aims to fill this
lacuna by utilizing variables from the GPN framework and introducing a
1For critiques along these lines see Hess and Yeung (2006), Sunley (2008), Yeung and
Coe (2015), Yeung and Coe (2015).
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formal dynamic model in which: (i) governance structures are shaped by
the bargaining dynamics between producers and buyers in the chain, (ii)
bargaining power is contingent on the geographic possibilities of production
and (iii) this bargaining affects the distribution of profits between buyers and
producers.
Our model, being the first of its kind to analyze governance dynamics, offers
a novel means of studying the evolution of governance structures by taking
into account the effects of geography in bargaining between global buyers
(brands/retailers) and suppliers/producers (manufacturers). Our analysis
draws on some, but not all, elements from both GVC and GPN literature.
As such, we do not claim that our model is a formalisation of either GVC or
GPN frameworks, while sharing key components of both. Thus, we refer to
the structure of our model as a Global Value Network (GVN).
Our GVN assumes two types of firms that we call buyer(s) and producers.
Simplifying the firm types allows us to more easily link power relations with
governance types. Within this context what we call producers are the out-
sourced manufacturer sometimes referred to as ‘suppliers’ in the literature.
Whilst what we call buyers includes brands, retails or even producers that
are ‘buying’ a good from an outsourced manufacturer.
We introduce the concept of Degree of Monopsony Power (DMP) as essential
in determining the share of value captured by buyers in the GVN. Drawing on
Mahutga (2012, 2014) we relate governance structures on producers entry-
exit dynamics and on buyers’ bargaining power captured by DMP. As we
demonstrate in our model, higher DMP leads to a greater share of value
captured by buyers resulting in increased downward pressure on producers.
In this way, if DMP rises then the ‘buyer-driven’ dynamics of the GVN are
intensified. Conversely, when DMP falls then the GVN takes on a more
‘producer-driven’ character.
In our framework, the DMP of a buyer depends on the number of pro-
ducer firms able to compete for the production of a commodity. Due to
the geographic dispersion of producers, there is a distribution of costs among
them which depends on the local institutional specificities. In this way, ge-
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ographic dispersion of production affects the variance of the distribution of
costs among the producers. Furthermore, the number of firms able to pro-
duce a commodity will depend on the share of total value obtained by the
buyer firm. Thus, an increase in the share of profits that the buyer obtains,
leads to a smaller number of producer firms able to compete, causing the
consolidation and growth in the size of those firms.
The formal model herein is motivated by an explicit call from Sheppard (2001,
2011), Bergmann, Sheppard and Plummer (2009), Plummer and Sheppard
and Haining (2012) among others for the development and use of formal dis-
equilibrium models within Geographical Political Economy. For this reason,
our model does not rely on the methodological framework of neoclassical eco-
nomics where the properties of the economy result from the optimal decisions
of agents (eg. firms). Rather, it uses behavioral equations which capture the
relevant properties of the economy (in our case of global production). Our
framework belongs to the family of the dynamic disequilibrium models fre-
quently used in post-Keynesian and neo-Marxian traditions2 and also has
similarities with the Evolutionary Economic Geography framework3.
Even though our approach shares some of the main methodological assump-
tions of the post-Keynesian models, it also abstracts from others which are
characteristic of the post-Keynesian tradition like effective demand, or the
role of capacity utilization. While these assumptions are important when
analysing the macroeconomy, our approach is able to abstract from these
issues since our level of analysis is the value chain and not the national econ-
omy. However, the choice of this framework lays the ground which can allow
for synergies between post-Keynesian and GVC/GPN approaches within the
broader field of critical political economy.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 motivate the key fea-
tures of our modelling framework, namely allowing (i) for a continuum of
governance types, (ii) for the types to change over time and (iii) to under-
stand DMP as the principle constituent of these dynamics. Section 2 briefly
2For example, see Chiarella and Flaschel (2000), Chiarella et al. (2006), Flaschel et al.
(2017) and references therein.
3For example see Martin, R. and P. Sunley (2007) and references therein.
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examines how governance structures relate to power dynamics and demon-
strates the usefulness of treating these governance structures as a contin-
uum. Section 3, (a) builds on previous studies which reveal the dynamism of
governance structures in which the specificity of relations cannot be under-
stood through overarching categories and (b) highlights the centrality of the
monopsonistic structure of the market and introduces the concept of DMP.
In section 4, we present our formal model. Section 5, presents the results
of the model relating them directly to a number of examples in the garment
sector. Section 6, discusses several of the model’s assumptions and proposes
directions for future research. Section 7, concludes.
2 Global Value Chain Typologies
In recent decades, GVC literature has in large part focused on the relevance
of the original buyer-driven versus producer-driven governance dichotomy.
Producer-driven chains are those in which large transnational manufacturers
play a central role in coordinating value chains. These chains are predomi-
nantly in high technology, vertically-integrated, capital-intensive sectors such
as automotive, aeronautic, and heavy machinery industries. Here value cap-
ture at the point of production is greatest because of high-barriers to entry,
limited competition, and enhanced ‘control over backward linkages with raw
material and component suppliers, and forward linkages into distribution
and retailing’ (Gereffi, 2002, 3). Gereffi’s theory is based on the assumption
that ‘lead firms’ in producer-driven chains typically belong to international
oligopolies (e.g. Ford, Airbus, Caterpiller, etc.). These large, often transna-
tional and oligopolistic firms, have greater access to finance and self-finance
(through the retention of profits), and are therefore capable of substantial
technological enhancement. Increased investment in fixed capital simultane-
ously raises the firms liability while helping it to be dominant in the value
chain, exerting a great deal of influence on smaller and highly dependent
subcontracted firms.
At the other end we find ‘buyer-driven’ GVCs, which are in low-value, low
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technology, vertically dis-integrated sectors such as garments, footwear, toys,
furniture, and light electronics. These sectors maintain a high degree of ‘frag-
mentation’ (Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001) and a wide spatial spread. This
extensive geography is an outgrowth of low barriers to entry at the producer-
end since manufacturing costs are low with minimum capital investment, re-
sulting in mostly small and mid-size firms competing intensely at ‘lower end’
GVC phases.
While Gereffi’s category of ‘producer-driven’ resembled the Fordist model
of production that embodied capitalist modernity, the novelty was found
in his introduction of the buyer-driven GVC (Gibbon, Bair, Ponte 2008).
A key intervention is the recognition that the relationship between buyer
and producer is asymmetrical without a formal hierarchy. In the absence of
a formal hierarchy, power becomes the central driver in shaping the GVC
(Bair 2008).
Many studies built on Gereffi’s original binary, in which powerful actors dic-
tated the size, capacity, and upgrading of outsourced manufacturers (Lee and
Cason 1994; Knutsen 2004; Tokatli 2004; Kumar 2014; Kumar and Mahoney
2014). Among the most influential of these has been the work of Sturgeon
(2001; 2002; 2003)4. Sturgeon (2001) builds on the original framework of
Gereffi by focusing on the degree of standardisation of production and how
this is reflected in the GVC. As Sturgeon (2001, 15) states, ‘we need to link
our terms not to firms, sectors, or places but to the specific bundles of ac-
tivities that firms are engaged in.’ To that end he constructs five types of
value chain/production network ‘actors’, defined by their ‘scope of activity’:
integrated, retailer, lead firm, turn-key supplier, component supplier.
As a response to these challenges to Gereffi’s original types, Gereffi et al.
(2005, 79) generated a framework to capture the ‘shifting governance struc-
tures’ to move beyond the duality of the buyer and producer driven frame-
work. In particular, they focus their attention on the ‘possibilities for firms
in developing countries to enhance their position in global markets’, and in
theory we are motivated by a similar purpose. Where we part ways is in
4For a summary of different types of critiques see Gibbon, Bair, and Ponte (2008).
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what is proposed. Gereffi et al. (2005) propose a five-part typology to value
chain governance taking account of the evolving nature of GVCs and upgrad-
ing potential. By taking account of the degree of explicit coordination and
increasing power asymmetry, these governance categories are understood in
the following order: market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy.
In Market GVCs both buyer and suppliers are able to switch partners with
relative ease. In Modular, similar to Sturgeon’s (2002, 2003) ‘turn-key’, the
supplier firm produces exclusively for lead firms with higher liability for the
supplier. Relational GVCs have a high degree of capability at the supplier-
end contributing to a mutually dependent relationship. In Captive there is
a clear dependent relationship between small suppliers and large lead firms
with the lead firm maintaining a large degree of control. Hierarchical chains
are vertically integrated, with a high degree of managerial control.
Furthermore, Gereffi et al. (2005) go beyond the buyer/producer dichotomy
by adding complexity of transactions, codifiability of information, and ca-
pability of suppliers, in determining GVC governance structures. We are
indebted to their proposed typology which explains the conditions of indus-
trial upgrading and its effect on the GVC. Our work extends on this in two
directions. Firstly, while the governance categories of Gereffi et al. (2005)
express a discrete spectrum of GVC governance characteristics, our model
recognizes the spectrum as continuous. Secondly, while the aim of Gereffi et
al. (2005) is to more accurately describe the characteristics of each of the
categories, our focus is to understand the forces that drive the change from
one structure to another and to identify any long run trend.
Both Gereffi et al. (2005) and the present paper place power centrally to un-
derstanding the changes in GVC structures. In what follows, we draw on the
work of Mahutga (2012, 2014) who argued that ‘the original buyer/producer-
driven governance scheme is a continuum running between the buyer and
producer-driven ideal types’ (Mahutga, 2012: 9).
Mahutga (2014) utilizes Gereffi’s binary to highlight the significance of barri-
ers to entry in determining the bargaining power of actors within the global
supply chain. He argues that the relative supply of manufacturers and buy-
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ers in a given chain is an indication of a manufacturer’s barrier to entry and
therefore their bargaining power. Supporting this claim empirically through
cross-national data, Mahutga shows that a manufacturer’s bargaining power
is inversely related to the available alternatives. Simply put, for a manu-
facturer fewer alternatives mean greater bargaining power, more alternatives
mean less bargaining power, and vice versa for buyer firms. Critically, ‘the
main point of similarity across buyer/producer-driven chains is that their
structures reflect the most optimal location of activities, both inside and
outside of the lead firm, from the perspective of the lead firm.’ (Mahutga
2012: 6 emphasis theirs).
3 Degree of Monopsony Power in a Dynamic
Context
3.1 Degree of Monopsony Power and Governance Dy-
namics
Within our framework, we assume imperfect competition and DMP is a key
variable of our model. Imperfect competition is a standard assumption both
in the GVC/GPN and post-Keynesian literatures5 but also is often found
within the neoclassical microeconomic literature. To reiterate, our modelling
framework has key methodological differences with the neoclassical approach
but is not ‘strictly’ post-Keynesian due to differences in our level of analysis.
Monopsony according to Robinson (1969), refers to a market with many sell-
ers and a single buyer or in the case of labor markets, a single firm and more
workers than the ones needed by the firm. Here we consider - instead of one
employer and many workers - a single buyer firm and many producer firms.
Note that on this level of analysis, the concept of the degree of monopoly
power of a producer firm vis− a`−vis the buyer, captures exactly the inverse
relationship of the degree of monopsony power of the buyer vis− a`− vis the
5For example see Coutts and Normal (2013) and Lee (2013).
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producers. Based on this, we could focus on the degree of monopoly power
rather than on the degree of monopsony power, however this would make
the analysis more complicated and would not allow for a tractable analytical
model.
More concretely, in our framework, we define monopsony power as the ability
of the buyer firms to extract higher value from the producers than what
would be the case in a perfectly competitive market. Furthermore, the degree
of monopsony power aims to capture the level of this ability, such that a
relatively high degree of monopsony power results in a greater share of value
obtained by the buyer firms. In low DMP GVNs, producers are the drivers of
the GVN and tend to retain direct control over capital-intensive phases of the
GVN, while subcontracting out more labor-intensive functions to suppliers
that are organized hierarchical and managed by the producer firm.
Within GVC analysis the concept of monopsony has been used, albeit more
descriptively, to understand the asymmetry of power between buyers and
producers (see Abernathy et al. 1999; Nathan et al. 2007; Milberg and
Winkler 2013; Azarhoushang et al. 2015; Anner et al. 2015; Anner 2015;
Mayer and Phillips 2017). We maintain that the relationship between the
number of producers able to compete in relation to the number of buyers in
the market shapes and circumscribes the dynamics of the GVN. As Nathan
and Kalpana (2007, 4) outline:
‘The lead firms in buyer driven chains have enormous, oligopolis-
tic market power. As buyers the volume of their purchases gives
them monopsonistic power. On the other hand, with the spread
of manufacturing and processing capabilities around the world,
the suppliers are in very competitive markets. This asymmetry
of market positions, oligopoly / monopsony vs. competitive, leads
to a corresponding asymmetry in bargaining power. Lead firms
are able to utilize their buying power to beat down suppliers’
prices.’
A key contribution of our model is in recognizing that governance struc-
tures change over time due to fluctuations in firms market power. A prime
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example of this type of dynamism is found in the garment sector. The mid-
1990s saw the beginning of the end for the 30-year Multifibre Agreement
(MFA). Ushered in 1974, the MFA established import quotas for garments
and textiles produced in the Global South and remained one of the few checks
on the unrestrained globalizing of the garment and textile sectors.
However, even bounded by the MFA straightjacket, value nonetheless accrued
to buyers sitting at the top of the chain. As the MFA came to a close this
power gap between buyers and their suppliers began to widen further. Anner
et al. (2015, 7) observe that as the price paid per square meter in the interna-
tional market dropped as the MFA was being phased out (1995-2005). They
explain this phenomenon through two factors both linked to the end of the
MFA. Firstly buyers, no longer bogged down by the same quota constraints,
began shifting production from regions with relatively high labor costs, such
as in Mexico and Central America, towards those with lower labor costs, such
as China and Southeast Asia. Secondly, they claim that these changes reflect
the ‘growing concentration of retailer power vis-a-vis suppliers, where, as a
result of monopsonistic supply chain structures, retailers and major brand
manufacturers are increasingly able to squeeze lower prices from their ranks
of global suppliers’. In particular this latter contention corresponds with our
model, which shows that lowering the restrictions on trade results in higher
DMP and a greater share of value to the buyer.
This coheres with Feenstra (1998) who linked the ‘disintegration of produc-
tion’ in the international economy with the ‘integration of trade’. As Gereffi
et al. (2005, 80) state ‘the rising integration of world markets through trade
has brought with it a disintegration of multinational firms, since companies
are finding it advantageous to ‘outsource’ an increasing share of their non-
core manufacturing and service activities both domestically and abroad.’
As we moved into the post-MFA era in the mid/late 2000s, the heightened
DMP reached its zenith. With increased downward pressure and falling
source price offered by buyers, increasingly fewer suppliers were able to com-
pete. This process has seen globalized competition weaken, with an almost
endless number of small firms across the globe disappearing, absorbed into
10
larger rivals or forced to merge. What is emergent is a coterie of mega-
producers in a handful of labor-rich countries (Lopez-Acevedo et al. 2012;
Applebaum 2008, Azmeh and Nadvi 2014, Merk 2014). Meanwhile, large re-
tailer/brand oligopolies simultaneously benefit from growing profits brought
on by economies of scale and integration, while becoming gradually depen-
dent on increasingly oligopolistic outsourced manufacturers. Thus, with the
transition away from high DMP is a move away from the ‘buyer-driven’ end
of the spectrum.
3.2 Consolidation and Symbiosis
As part of the logic discussed above, the result of falling sourcing prices by
buyers, was the vanishing of uncompetitive firms, and the mergers and acqui-
sitions of firms into mega-firms. The rise of consolidated firms in the global
garment sector has a material basis in the logic of capital itself. Producer
firms in ‘buyer-driven’ sectors and the states they reside are placed under
constant downward pressure by global buyers to cut costs, produce greater
volume of goods at quicker turnover times, stock less inventory, ensure la-
bor discipline and so on. As such what remains constant within capitalist
development is the increasing efficiency, size and reliability of firms. Over a
relatively short period of time this downward pressure left fewer and fewer
firms able to compete. Consequently, these firms would produce more having
absorbed the production capacity of smaller firms.
Marx’s economic writings - particularly volume 1 and 2 of Capital and the
Grundrisse - argue that the increases in speed, scale, size and cost-efficiency
of production are motivated by competitive pressures. This is part of the in-
ner logic of capital accumulation. Therefore, consolidation is not an anomaly
but part of the structural dynamics of capitalist development. Consolidation
also assists in shortening the time of production, circulation, and distribu-
tion. Recent decades have seen firms associated with the ‘developing world’
become increasingly adept at generating ‘value added’ activities across the
value chain.
There is an increased recognition of garment manufacturing firm growth,
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particularly in Asia, in the post-MFA world (Applebaum, 2008; Azmeh and
Nadvi, 2014; Merk 2014; Gereffi 2014). The sector’s, low value and low
technology, established low barriers to entry began to change with the end
of the MFA. Consequently, the trend towards consolidation has accelerated.
Global brands have dramatically reduced the number of producers in fewer
countries and reduced associated costs of logistics, warehousing and turnover
time. For example in Sri Lanka, where between 2005-2014 the number of
garment factories has contracted by 50%, while the share of exports to the
US and EU remained constant, and larger Sri Lankan suppliers, such as
Brandix or MAS Holding, grew significantly. These are similar to trends in
other ‘labor-rich’ countries (Kumar, 2019b forthcoming).
Gereffi’s (2014) recent research goes even further in recognizing the growing
role of increasingly consolidated contractor firms such as Foxconn in electron-
ics; Li & Fung in apparel; and Yue Yuen in footwear. This growth of larger
producers is contributing to declining DMP for buyers. Crucially, we identify
contracting DMP as leading directly to low-value small and mid-size firms
morphing into higher value large supplier firms. This move into value-added
phases of the GVC transforms the decidedly buyer-driven character of the
GVC into something markedly different.
We call this different intermediate phase as buyer-producer symbiosis rec-
ognizing the growing ‘symbiotic’ market power relationship in garment and
footwear between large transnational buyers and large transnationlizing pro-
ducers. Crucially, consolidation has played the central role in these new
relations of power. As we have established GVCs are not static, and just as
‘the increase[ed] disaggregation of value chains [. . . ] allowed new kinds of
lead firms to capture value’ (Pickles and Smith, 2016, 25) so too the merg-
ers, acquisitions and consolidation of supplier-end capitals into large capital
holding producers allow new kinds of garment and footwear supplier firms to
capture value.
‘Buyer-producer symbiosis’, is not limited to the calculable relationship (i.e.
transaction costs) between buyer and producer but resembles one-half of Ger-
effi’s (1994, 95) original formulation which was to, ‘show how “big buyers”
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have shaped the production networks in the world’s most dynamic exporting
countries, especially in the newly industrialized countries of East Asia.’ As
Starosta (2010, 437) observes, ‘the concept of governance was originally de-
vised to depict the diversity of authority and power relationships that give
overall coordination to the division of labor within the commodity chain’.
In this vein, the introduction of ‘symbiosis’ is an observation of the power
relationship, through an analysis inter alia of changes in structure, technol-
ogy, and geography, as the consequence of the emergence of giant capitals on
either side of historically low DMP GVCs.
4 Model
We consider a very basic GVN structure where a single buyer firm outsources
(part of) the production of a product. We assume that there are N > 1
producer firms in the market, where the number N varies due to reasons
which we discuss in detail below. Following Mahutga (2012, 2014) we can
relate the governance structures with the number of competing firms.
Assume that the buyer outsources the production of a good to firm F i, where
i ≤ N . We define as value, the variable v, with
v = piB + piiP + ci, (1)
where piB are the profits of the buyer firm and piiP ci be the profits and costs of
F i per good produced. We use value (rather than value added), to highlight
the difference with the standard definition of value added where only profits
(and not costs) are included. From equation (1) we can say that for given
v and ci, the higher the value of piB, the more ‘buyer-driven’ the GVN is.
Given that we are interested in the changes in piB for a given v, we can
reformulate equation (1) by dividing both sides by v and denoting by s the
profits that the buyer obtains as a share of value: pi
i
P
v
= s. Hence, with some
rearrangement, equation (1) becomes
piiP
v
= 1− s− c
i
v
. (2)
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A producer firm would only be able, or have an incentive, to enter the market
if their potential profits are positive. For this to be true, costs have to be
sufficiently low for a given v and s, i.e. the following relationship should hold
1− s > c
i
v
. (3)
Based on this reformulation, equation (3) can be also understood as a type
of a market entry condition for producer firms. From equation (3), it follows
that the number of producer firms which are able to compete for the produc-
tion of a good with given v, depends on s and the distribution of the costs
ci.
Note that the costs ci vary across firms due to a number of reasons such as
transportation costs differentials, network externalities6 and other conditions
of production which remain contingent on specific local cost considerations
such as taxes and/or labor laws. It is evident that the distribution of ci
depends on these factors. For example, if all possible producer firms had
close geographic proximity within the same country, then given the same
transportation costs, and legal framework, ci would {not vary significantly
across firms. However, if high geographic proximity is not assumed, then the
variance of ci would be greater.
Hence, the number of producer firms able (or with incentives) to join the
market, N , will depend not only on the buyer’s profits s, but also on the
geographical distribution of production through its effect on the distribution
of ci. Furthermore, the costs of production are also influenced by the available
techniques. This means that on average technological change will lead to
production costs diminishing over time, thus allowing more producer firms
to join the market. Let:
• γ capture the geographical concentration of firms such that high γ
means that firms are spatially concentrated and hence low variance in
the distribution of ci, while high values of γ would correspond to the
opposite situation; and
6We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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• δ capture the positive effects of technological change on increasing N
by reducing costs across firms on average,
such that N increases if
δ
γ
> s. (4)
This condition is related to the intuition of equation (3) as the less geograph-
ically disperse firms are (high γ), the more concentrated ci will be. This will
then mean on average that less firms will be able to compete. Based on this,
we can formally express the change in the number of producer firms in the
market, N˙ 7, as
N˙ = δ − γs. (5)
Equation (5) captures the interrelated effects of technological change and the
geographical possibilities of production on the number of producer firms in
the market. For given s, if production is highly spatially concentrated (high
γ), then technological improvements may not necessarily have positive effects
on reducing costs as these improvements may not ‘reach’ that specific place
of production. Alternatively, if production is spatially dispersed then it is
more probable that at least some of the firms will benefit from technological
improvements.
As Mahutga (2012, 2014) has convincingly argued, governance structures
can be related to the number of competing firms. Specifically, when the
ratio of buyers to producers is low (high), he has showed that the governance
structure is buyer-driven (producer-driven). By assuming a single buyer in
our framework, the relative position of the governance structure within the
buyer-driven/ producer-driven spectrum is dictated by N .
Let d be the DMP of the buyer firm. Following from our definition of DMP,
a change in d is positively related to a change in N . Given that the DMP
of the buyer is positively related to N it follows that relatively high (low)
d means that the governance structure is relatively buyer-driven (producer-
driven). In this way, changes in d capture changes in governance. Then from
7For simplicity we assume continuous time throughout and for any variable z, z˙ is the
time derivative.
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equation (5), the change in d can be expressed as
d˙ = αN˙ = α(δ − γs), (6)
where α > 0 captures the relative effect of changes of N on d˙. From equation
(6), we see that the intuition following equation (5) is also true for DMP and
hence for the governance of the GVN. In other words, fora given level of s
and technological improvement, the spatial concentration/dispersion of pro-
duction will play the key role in changes regarding DMP and the governance
of the GVN.
Up to now we have focused on changes in DMP and have assumed the profits
of the buyer firm s (given v) as fixed. However, as we have already discussed,
s depends itself on the DMP of the buyer firm. More specifically, from the
definition of DMP, it follows that a change in s will depend on the level of
d at that point in time. Given that a change in s can be either positive or
negative, we assume that there exists a level for d, call this d˜, such that
(i) for d = d˜, s remains unchanged which means that s˙ = 0,
(ii) if d > d˜, then s increases, hence s˙ > 0,
(iii) if d < d˜, then s increases, hence s˙ < 0.
Based on this, we can express the change in s as
s˙ = d− d˜. (7)
The level of d˜ is affected by the consolidation process which takes place due to
competition8. More specifically we account for the fact that the consolidated
producer firms have relatively higher bargaining power due to their increased
8In what Nolan, Zhang and Liu (2008) label the ‘cascade effect’, they argue that since
the 1980s there has been a growing global industrial concentration across the value chain
through merger of non-core activities, which is brought on by intense downward pressure
by large buyers. Nolan, Zhang and Liu (2008: 45) demonstrate that ‘at every level there
has taken place an intense process of industrial concentration, mainly through merger and
acquisition, as firms struggle to meet the strict requirements that are the condition of their
participation in the system integrators’ supply chains.’
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size. Hence, consolidation reduces the relative effect of the bargaining power
power of the buyer firm on the distribution of profits between buyer and
producer. Given that consolidation is inversely related to the rate of increase
of active firms, d˜ depends negatively on N˙ . Based on this, we can express d˜
as
d˜ = β0 − β1N˙ = β0 − β1(δ − γs). (8)
Then from (7) and (8), we get
s˙ = d− β0 + β1(δ − γs), (9)
where β1 ∈ (0, 1) captures the importance of the consolidation effects on
DMP and β0 > 0 is the level of DMP for which there is no change in s
when no consolidation is taking place. From this we can see that that due
to consolidation, the higher the value of s the more difficult (in terms of d)
it is to further increase.
5 Results
The system of equations (6) and (9), fully describe the dynamics of our GVN.
In this section we will analyse the evolution of the two endogenous variables
d and s. Define as the steady state of (6) and (9), the values of d and s such
that s˙ = d˙ = 0. In words, this means that if d and s are equal to their steady
state values, then these will not change over time.
However, the most interesting question is how the variables behave if their
values are not the steady state values. In the type of systems as the one
here9, the behavior of the variables out of the steady state can take three
forms:
1. converge to the steady state values, which means that the steady state
is stable
2. diverge from the steady state values, or,
9Meaning a system of two linear differential equations.
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3. move around the steady state values in a cyclical manner without con-
verging or diverging.
Furthermore, in the first and second cases, convergence or divergence can
be realized in a cyclical way. The specific behavior of the system, which
represents a GVN here, depends on the relative values of our exogenous
variables and parameters. The following proposition describes the dynamics
of our GVN:
Proposition 1. The GVN described by (6) and (9):
(i) has a steady state at d = β0, s = δγ ,
(ii) the steady state is always stable and
(iii) the steady state is a spiral node if β1 <
√
4α
γ
.
Proof
See Appendix.
The key insight from Proposition 1, is that the steady state is stable. This
results from the fact that model is characterised by two opposite forces which
depend to each other and counteract one another. Given that the steady state
is always stable, it means that the GVN governance will be converging to
a an intermediate structure of the buyer-driven/producer-driven continuum.
This convergence captures what we previously defined as buyer-producer
symbiosis. Hence, we can refer to the steady state here, as symbiotic steady
state. As we can see from Proposition 1 the symbiotic level of profits of the
buyer firm (as a share of value) depends on the level of technological progress
and the spatial concentration of producers. This follows closely from the
fact that high spatial concentration of production may impose limitations on
being able to take full advantage of technical change.
Proposition 1 also shows that the convergence to the symbiotic state can
happen in two different ways: smooth or through cyclical oscillations (spiral
node). Interestingly, the type of convergence depends on the geographical
dispersion of production. The last part of Proposition 1 argues that low geo-
graphical dispersion (high γ) will ceteris paribus lead to a smooth transition
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to the symbiotic state. The transition is also smooth when the effects of
consolidation are important (high β1).
While the key result from the model is the transition to the symbiotic state,
Proposition 1 shows that when the transition is not smooth, the governance
characteristics of a GVN might change over time. For example, before a pro-
ducer driven GVN reaches the symbiotic steady state it may, for a relatively
short period, become more buyer driven compared to the symbiotic steady
state and vice versa. The two different cases regarding the transition to the
symbiotic state, are shown in the figures below. The horizontal axis is time,
while on the vertical axis are the values of our variables. In the four first
graphs the orange lines correspond to the symbiotic values, while the blue
lines correspond to the variables when these do not start from the the sym-
biotic state values. Specifically, in all cases the initial value for the variables
is 13 .
The first and second figures show the evolution of s (figure 1) and d (figure
2) when production is spatially concentrated (high γ). Figures 3 and 4 show
the dynamics of s and d respectively, when production is spatially dispersed
(low γ). For figures 1 and 2 the parameter values are α = 1/8, β0 = 1/2,
β1 = 3/4, γ = 2/3 δ = 1/4. For figures 3 and 4 the parameter values are
α = 1/2, β0 = 1/2, β1 = 1/4, γ = 1/3, δ = 1/5. In all figures the parameter
values were chosen around the two values of γ (low=1/3 and high=2/3) and
the conditions of the Proposition in order to provide a visual representation
of the key results. Finally figure 5 shows the evolution of the number of firms
N for the two previous configurations.
[Place figures here]
The previous graphs represent the two different type of dynamics that can
be observed in our model as shown in Proposition 1. In all cases we can
see a convergence to the steady state value of each of the variables. The
difference has to do with how disperse production is. As figure 5 shows,
high geographical dispersion (low γ) allows for a higher number of firms able
to compete which means that N can get a greater range of values than in
the opposite case (high γ). As N is directly related to DMP, d will follow
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similar dynamics to N . Hence given the stability of the steady state, a high
range of values for d will lead to cyclical convergence. This highlights the
potential instability of governance structures due to potential changes in the
geographic extent of production.
The purpose of this paper has been to put forward a disequilibrium model
able to capture the changes in governance in global production. Our model
reveals that, given our assumptions, a GVN converges to a symbiotic state.
Gereffi et. al. (2005) cite the garment sector, amongst others, which they
identify as moving from a high DMP structure (captive) to a lower DMP one
(relational) and predict the emergence of consolidated ‘full package’ suppliers
may move it further to an even lower DMP structure (modular). This is
reflected in our model as high DMP immediately followed the unrestricted
free flow of goods from sellers to buyers. However, afterwards DMP steadily
falls due competitive pressures and consolidation.
An indicative example within the garment sector is in denim value chains,
whose developments become barometers of the sector as a whole. Denim
remained relatively inoculated from fashion-sensitivity and seasonality that
plagued other parts of the sector. This allowed it to remain vertically inte-
grated well into the 1990s. However, in the 2000s and following the end of
the MFA it became fragmented. Recent years have seen denim become con-
solidated faster than other parts of the sector (Kumar 2018). This evolution
of the denim sector from low to high DMP and now back to low DMP follows
the intuition of our model highlighted in figure 4. This is also mirrored in
the highly standardized production of men’s underwear (Kumar, forthcoming
2019b).
Another illustrative example, adjacent to the garment sector, is found in
global footwear. Footwear is an object lesson in these long-term trends be-
cause it was the sole clothing industry unencumbered by the MFA. The rela-
tively untrammelled growth and globalisation of footwear production resulted
in greater oligopoly of buyers. They were able to accomplish this because
they had a highly monopsonistic relationship with manufacturers in markets
with low barriers to entry (Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000). Eventually, com-
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petition compelled smaller manufacturers to consolidate. This caused a fall
in DMP, producing an increase in the share of value for manufacturers, giving
them more weight in negotiations with buyers. Fast forward to the present
day, Adidas and Nike, who together control over 50% of the world market
for sport and casual shoes (Merk, 2008), have announced that they will be
opening fully-automated production facilities in Germany, France, the US,
and the UK (Kumar, 2019a). This can be read as a response to a symbiosis
in the footwear industry which has created a crisis in profitability and left
the major brands exposed.
6 Extensions
By keeping our model general, we have necessarily assumed several variables
as being exogenous and we have focused on a simplified production network.
We have shown that the convergence towards the symbiotic steady state
does not depend on any assumptions regarding the relative strength of the
different forces described in section 4. Thus, even though our results are quite
general regarding the convergence to the symbiotic state, our framework can
be extended in different directions which could on the one hand allow for a
more detailed exploration of the dynamics of the model while on the other
help explain other phenomena. Below we identify four possible directions of
future research, each of which relaxes at least one of our current assumptions
and creates the possibility of disequilibrating dynamics.
Space
In our model, space plays a key role in having heterogeneous producer firms.
The spatial dispersion of production affects both the level of the symbiotic
state and the dynamics towards this. This component of our model (at least
partially) fills the lacuna identified by David Harvey regarding the state of
modern (macro)economics: ‘macroeconomists, even those with interests in
development, have a weak grasp of how to handle the production of space in
their theories and models’ (Harvey, 2001, 23). In the present paper we have
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assumed our main spatial variable γ, to be exogenous. However, as we know
from Harvey’s (2001, 2006) notion of the ‘spatial fix’, the geographic dis-
persion of production changes over time due to capitalism’s attempt to ‘fix’
its inner crisis tendencies by geographic expansion or restructuring. Hence,
a natural extension of our model would be to endogenize γ, by making it
contingent on the profitability of the buyer firm(s). This will on one hand
provide an explicit spatial structure to our model, while on the other it in-
troduces a force which can make the variables move away from the symbiotic
steady state.
Technological Change and Labor Bargaining
Technological change and labor bargaining are both implicit in our framework
and their effects are captured by the exogenous variables δ and ci respectively.
Participating in global production can have positive effects on technological
improvements and can also lower unemployment, which in turn can positively
affect the bargaining power of workers. For this reason technical change can
have opposing effects on the costs of producers. The overall effect will depend
on the relative strength of these two different forces, which mainly depends
on the assumptions regarding (i) the influence of technical change to labor
and capital productivity, (ii) the substitutability between capital and labor
in the production process and (iii) to whether the factors of production are
fully employed (Tavani and Zamparelli, 2017). Hence δ and ci could be
endogenized in different ways based on the assumptions with respect to (i),
(ii) and (iii). The key question which arises form this, is how the different
model closures, will affect the symbiotic steady state and whether there will
be multiple ones.
Post-Keynesian Insights
As we have already mentioned, despite our model sharing the same method-
ological framework used in post-Keynesian (and other heterodox models),
our model is not strictly post-Keynesian. This is mainly due to our level of
analysis being a value chain rather than a national economy and our focus be-
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ing the power dynamics between two levels of production. Our specific focus
has allowed us to abstract from several of the key insights of post-Keyensian
economics like the role of effective demand and capacity utlization. However,
the role of effective demand could be used to extend our model for analyzing
how participation in a GVC/GPN would have different impacts depending
on (i) the governance structures and (ii) whether the growth regimes of the
country of production is profit-led or wage-led 10.
Network Effects
The GVN presented here corresponds to probably the most simple network
possible regarding global production. Extending our framework to more
than two levels of production would necessarily lead to a more complicated
network structure. In this situation, the DMP of the buyer would not only
depend on the number of competing producer firms, but would also depend
on the network structure itself (Mahutga, 2014). Based on this, another
possible extension of our framework would be an agent based model where
the market power of any firm is a function of its centrality in the production
network.
7 Conclusion
GVC dynamics reflect the tensions and contradictions between producers and
buyers. As Inomata argues: “The main objective of GVC studies is to ex-
plore the interplay between value distribution mechanisms and organization
of the cross-border production consumption nexus.” (Inomata, 2017, 19).
The aim of our paper has been to contribute to this objective by analyzing
the governance structure dynamics. We have done this by using a simplified
GVC framework where the governance structures are affected by variables
used frequently in the GPN literature.
10A profit-led demand regime is a regime where an increase of the profit share has
positive effect on aggregate demand, while the opposite is true for a wage-led regime. For
details see Onaran and Galanis (2014) and references therein.
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We have analysed this evolution by developing the first, to our knowledge,
formal dynamic model of governance structures. Despite our model drawing
on both GVC and GPN research, we do not claim that ours is a general
model capturing the GVC and/or GPN frameworks in their totality. In order
to highlight this point, we have named our modelling framework as GVN
and we have constructed a dynamic disequilibrium model of bargaining and
distribution of profits. We have introduced the degree of monopsony power
as the key variable that affects bargaining, such that higher DMP leads to
an increase in the share of value obtained by the producer firm. The spatial
specificities of production along with changes in the distribution of value,
lead to consolidation and also influence DMP.
Building on Mahutga (2012, 2014) we have analyzed governance structures as
a continuum and related the bargaining power of buyers vis a vis producers to
the relative position of governance in the buyer-driven/producer-driven spec-
trum. Our key results can be summarized as follows: (i) GVN governance will
move towards an intermediate structure, within the buyer-driven/producer-
driven continuum, which we call the symbiotic state, (ii) the relative strength
of the effects on firm entrance due to the geographical concentration of pro-
duction on one hand and the decrease of the total number of firms on the
other, affect the distribution of value between buyers and producers at the
symbiotic state and (iii) the transition dynamics towards the symbiotic state
depend on the effect of consolidation on buyers’ bargaining power and on the
spatial dispersion of production.
The model used here provides a synthesis between the formal disequilibrium
framework used traditionally in neo-Marxian and post-Keynesian economics,
the governance structure dynamics within the GVC framework, and variables
used in the GPN literature. In this way our paper contributes toward what
Barnes and Plummer (2010) refer to as ‘engaged pluralism’ in Anglophone
economic geography. It also contributes to the ongoing line of research which
creates links between formal radical political economy and economic geogra-
phy (Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Stockhammer, Durand and Ludwig, 2016;
Stockhammer, 2017). The dynamic nature of our framework highlights the
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importance of studying the evolution of governance structures and shares
some common features with the evolutionary economic geography approach.
Incorporating more ‘evolutionary’ characteristics to our model will further
strengthen these links and is a possible direction for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) d˙ = 0 if and only if
δ − γs = 0
which is true for s = δ
γ
.
Similarly s˙ = 0 if and only if
d = β0 − β1(δ − γs)
Substituting s = δ
γ
gives d = β0
Differentiating equation (9) with respect to time, we get
s¨ = d˙+ β1(γs˙). (10)
Substituting this to equation (6), gives
s¨ = α(δ − γs) + β1(γs˙). (11)
The characteristic equation of (11), then is
x2 − β1γx+ αγ = 0. (12)
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The discriminant D is
D = (β1γ)2 − 4αγ. (13)
Note that if β1 <
√
4α
γ
, thenD < 0, which means that the characteristic
equation has a pair of complex conjugate roots
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Figure 1: Blue line: s; orange line: steady state value for s.
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Figure 2: Blue line: s; orange line: steady state value for d.
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Figure 3: Blue line: s; orange line: steady state value for s.
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Figure 4: Blue line: s; orange line: steady state value for d.
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Figure 5: Blue line: N for low γ; orange line: N for high γ
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